July 16, 2024
Current Issues Polish Guerrilla Warfare

Detailed Bulletin: Polish Guerrilla Warfare: Debunking Jewish and Leftist Myths

  • The Polish Underground State had several features unique to German-occupied Europe: a hidden state apparatus, a photoengraving facility, and the Underground manufacture of British “Sten” guns (Ney-Krwawicz 2001).
  • The Jan T. Gross idiocy about “well-paid” Polish guerrillas is beyond obscene. It was, at most, subsistence payments (Szymanski 1973), and nothing could ever compensate for the nerve-wracking life of the Polish guerrilla.
  • Polish guerrilla actions were no tempest in a teapot. None other than Goebbels (1948) repeatedly complained about the magnitude of Polish guerrilla activity and the inability of the Germans to deal effectively with it.
  • Was Polish guerrilla activity an exercise in futile bloodletting? Hardly. Polish guerrilla acts were measured acts: They were always calculated for maximum military benefit relative to the cost from German reprisals (Bor Komorowski 1950).
  • In order to avoid any appearance of futile bloodletting, Polish Underground acts were at first restricted to intelligence gathering. Only later, in the face of increasing German terror, did they turn to sustained guerrilla action (Iranek-Osmecki 1954). Of course, the A. K. had to avoid any appearance of passivity because Communist propaganda portrayed non-Communist Poles as unwilling to fight the Germans, and therefore irrelevant to Poland’s future.
  • Finally, most Poles murdered by the Germans were not connected to guerrilla activity or to collective reprisals for such activity (Konigsberg 2017). In addition, the Germans had planned genocidal murder of Poles whether or not Poles had guerrilla movements.
  • Leftists and Jews, in their attacks on Polish heroism, have dismissed Polish guerrilla activity as quixotic, and as a manifestation of Polish romanticism. Wrong. Polish guerrilla activity was very practical and effective. As admitted even by German scholars (Aly 2008; Gerlach 2016), Polish guerrilla activity prevented a much harsher German occupation of Poland.
  • In addition, the assassination of Franz Kutschera itself reduced the subsequent German terror in occupied Warsaw (Zarnowski 2021). Sustained Polish guerrilla resistance eventually halted the Germans’ Genocidal Operation Zamosc (Housden 2003; Poprzeczny 2015).
  • Polish guerrilla warfare was so free of romantic adventurism than none other than Reinhard Gehlen (1972), a top-ranking intelligence officer in the Third Reich, proposed to top Nazi officials that the soon-to-be defeated Germans study and potentially emulate the Polish guerrilla efforts.
  • “All guerrillas were bandits” is a self-serving lie of the apologists for the Communist GL-AL, which has a well-earned reputation for banditry (Chodakiewicz 1997). The A. K. and NSZ were scrupulous about buying (and never simply confiscating) provisions from the population (Bukalski 2010, pp. 105-106; Chodakiewicz 1997, v. 1, pp. 196-197; Kulski 2006, p. 82; Ozarowski 1997, p. 280; Syryjczyk 2012, p. 44).
  • Perennial Jewish accusations about “so few” Jews accepted into the A. K. and NSZ ignore reality. Fugitive Jews were not good military material (Kwiatkowski 2021) as even admitted by Jews (Litai 1985; Spector 1986). Joiners had to come with their own weapons, which few Jews had (Zebrowski 2015). The Jewish physiognomy and lack of fluent Polish usually made Jews a self-evident risk, disqualifying them (Hilberg 1992, p. 207).
  • Finally, for security reasons, every prospective new A. K. member had to be long-known and sponsored by an existing A. K. member (IPN 2021; Zuker-Bujanowska 1980). Otherwise-qualified Jews had few if any potential sponsors owing to their choice of living in self-imposed separatism from Poles.
  • Jewish complaints about “so few” denouncers of Jews liquidated by Polish guerrillas are fallacious. Tracking suspected collaborators without being noticed was difficult. There was the ever-present danger of mistaken suspicions, and the Germans could set a trap for the pursuers in cases of genuine collaborators (Bukalski 2010, pp. 99-103).
  • Jewish accusations (as by Jan T. Gross) about Poles incurring the death penalty by possessing radios, but not by saving Jews, are idiotic. The radio, an inanimate object, could be hidden in creative places, such as in ricks of wheat (Rutkowski 2014, p. 58). Ironic to Gross, few Poles had radios–precisely out of fear of the Germans (Likiernik 2001, p. 72; Przesmycki 1991, p. 76).
  • Jewish complaints about Poles disclosing their Underground involvement to neighbors, while keeping Jew-rescue some kind of shameful secret, are Judeocentric nonsense. Fact is, Poles kept their Underground involvement a secret even from close neighbors (Ozarowski 1997, p. 151). Even a trustworthy neighbor could reveal sensitive information by mistake, or under torture.
  • Jewish accusations about Polish guerrillas not destroying the railroad tracks to the death camps are idiotic. Damaged tracks can, at worst, be repaired in a matter of days (Tworyanski 2009). And what if they could not? The Germans would just switch to mass shooting of Poland’s Jews (Aronson 2004) as they had been doing all along further east (the Holocaust By Bullets).
  • The NSZ partial break with the mainstream Polish Underground was fully justified. No sooner had the Red Army driven the Germans out of prewar Poland than the Soviets began to arrest, deport, and often murder the very A. K. units that had just fought on the Soviet side as part of Operation Tempest (Boguszewski 1961). If this did not prove beyond any doubt that the Soviet Union was an enemy of Poland (alongside Nazi Germany), then what could?
  • Furthermore, the Soviet betrayal of the Warsaw Uprising weighed heavily. None other than German General von Vormann, who was the one responsible for blocking any Soviet advance in the Warsaw sector, and whose task implied an expertise about the capabilities of the Red Army, had fully expected a Red Army move on Warsaw in August 1944 (Sawicki 1993).
  • Communist propaganda about the NSZ “an army of landlords” is bunk. Fully 90% of the NSZ consisted of peasants (Szucki 1992).
  • The smear against the NSZ Brygada Swietokrzyska as “Nazi collaborators” reeks to high heaven. There is a world of difference between local truces with the Nazi German forces, and collaboration with the Nazis! (Bohun-Dabrowski 1984).
  • The Jewish and leftist negativist obsession with Poland’s “heroic narrative” and “Poland the Jesus Christ of Nations” are just that. Even the “hyper-nationalist” NSZ publications freely discussed dishonorable Polish acts (such as collaboration) whenever the evidence so warranted (Kolaczynski 1961, 2018).
  • For the longest time, Jews (with a notable exception: Zimmerman 2015) had twisted A. K. Commander Bor Komorowski’s (1950) well-founded order to fight banditry into a veiled command to kill fugitive Jews. What a stinking lie! (Chodakiewicz 1997, vol. 3, p. 32, 35).
  • The Jewish fairy tale of Polish guerrillas killing Jews during the Warsaw Uprising is just that (Zebrowski 2013).
  • Contrary to its abundant Jewish detractors, the NSZ had repudiated any killing of Jews as Jews (Bechta and Zebrowski 1997).
  • Anti-Jewish killings blamed on the NSZ often turn out to be the deeds of the Germans, as demonstrated by archival information (Zebrowski 2018).
  • Now consider Przedborz. NSZ commander Kolacinski “Zbik” had a Jewish doctor in his unit, and two of his siblings hid Jews (Boguszewski 1964). If “Zbik” sought to “finish Hitler’s job” by killing Jews indiscriminately, then he was incompetent in doing it.
  • Leftist and Jewish idiocies know no bounds. If the alleged Romek Rajs “Bury” killing of a few Belarusians and Jews (Radzik 2021) constitutes genocide, then every single killing of Poles by Byelorussians or Jews ALSO constitutes genocide!
  • In the combat between Polish freedom fighters and the Jewish-saturated Communist GL-AL, the Communist forces sowed collective terror and the Poles sometimes retaliated collectively (Chodakiewicz 2003; Gontarczyk 2015), as at Parczew (Bechta 2014): Tit for tat.

 

Source: JewsandPolesDatabase.org (this website)

Aly. 2008. Hitler’s Beneficiaries, p. 160

Aronson. 2005. Hitler, the Allies, and the Jews, p. 290

Bechta. 2014. Pogrom Czy Odwet?, pp. 211-212

Bechta and Zebrowski. 1997. Narodowe Sily Zbrojne na Podlasiu, Vol. 2, p. 79

Boguszewski.1961. Zeszyte Do Historii Narodowych Sil Zbrojnych I, p. 37

Boguszewski.1964. Zeszyte Do Historii Narodowych Sil Zbrojnych III, pp. 95-96

Bohun-Dabrowski. 1984. Bylem Dowodca Brygady Swietokrzyskiej, pp. 141-145

Bor Komorowski. 1950. The Secret Army, pp. 171-172

Bukalski. 2010. Years Of Turmoil, pp. 99-103, 105-106

Chodakiewicz.1997. Tajne Oblicze GL-AL I PPR, v. 1, pp. 29-30, 196-197

Chodakiewicz. 2003. After the Holocaust, p. 223

Gehlen. 1972. The Service, p. 11

Gerlach. 2016. The Extermination of the European Jews, p. 251

Goebbels. 1948. The Goebbels Dairies 1942-1943, p. 396, 399-400

Gross. 2001. Who are you Mr. Grzimek?, p. 237

Hilberg. 1992. Perpetrators Victims Bystanders, p. 207

Housden. 2003. Hans Frank, pp. 186-191

IPN. 2021. Polish-Jewish Studies, Vol. 2, p. 128

Iranek-Osmecki. 1954. The Unseen and the Silent, p. 70

Kolaczynski. 1861, 2018. Miedzy Mloten a Swastyka, pp. 34-35, 137-139, 162-167

Konigsberg. 2017. AK 75, p. 10

Ney-Krwawicz. 2001. The Polish Resistance Home Army, p. vii, 99, 154

Kulski. 2006. Legacy of the White Eagle, p. 82

Kwiatkowski. 2021. 485 Days at Majdanek, p. 247

Likiernik. 2001. By Devil’s Luck, p. 72

Litai. 1985. Destruction and Resistance, p. 87

Moses. 2008. Empire, Colony, Genocide, p. 393

Ozarowski. 1997. Wolyn Aflame, p. 151, 280

Poprzeczny. 2015. Odilo Globocnik, p. 190

Przesmycki. 1991. The Sold Out Dream, p. 76

Radzik. 2021. Naszym Haslem Bog i Ojczyzna, pp. 548-549

Rutkowski. 2014. Z Ziemi Swietokrzyskiej Na Ziemi Odzyskane, p. 58

Sawicki. 1993. Wyrok Na Miasto, p. 16, 51

Spector. 1990. The Holocaust of Volhynian Jews, p. 128

Syryjczyk. 2012. Medical care in the unit of Henryk Dobrzanski “aka” Hubal. MILITARY PHARMACY AND MEDICINE 2:42-48

Szucki. 1992. Narodowe Sily Zbrojne, p. 5

Szymanski. 1973. Warsaw Aflame, p. 90

Tworyanski. 2009. As I Remember, p. 70

Zarnowski. 2021. Rather Die Than Betray the Cause, p. 43

Zebrowski. 2013. Paszkwil Wyborczej, p. 103

Zebrowski. 2018. O Najnowszej Historii Polski 1939-1989, p. 112

Zimmerman. 2015. The Polish Underground and the Jews, pp. 6-7

Zuker-Bujanowska. 1980. Lilliana’s Journal, pp. 79-80

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