November 4, 2024
Book Reviews

Warsaw Uprising Betrayed: Proof That the Red Army Was Militarily Capable of Taking Warsaw

Warsaw Uprising - WikipediaThe Red Army’s Lublin-Brest Offensive and Advance on Warsaw (18 July-30 September 1944): An Overview and Documentary Survey, by David M. Glantz. 2006. JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES 19(2)401-441.

Evil Betrayal: The Red Army WAS Militarily Capable of Taking Warsaw During the Warsaw Uprising

Author David M. Glantz is an American military historian, who specializes in the Red Army. He has studied the Soviet archives with regards to the Red Army east of Warsaw.

THE FAÇADE OF RED ARMY “MILITARY ONLY” POLICIES FALLS IMMEDIATELY

Glantz begins with the Red Army west of the Bug River. He quotes Stalin’s order, “‘Capture the city of Lublin no later than 26-27 July; first and foremost, employ Boganov’s 2nd Tank Army and Konstantinov’s 7th Guards Cavalry Corps to this end. Political conditions and the interests of an independent democratic Poland urgently require this.’” (p. 408).

So, here we have smoking-gun evidence, from none other than Stalin himself, that the movements of the Red Army were not governed solely by military considerations. They were also governed by politics! In this instance, Stalin prioritized the taking of Lublin because he wanted Lublin to serve as the nucleus of the “democratic” Communist puppet government that was about to be imposed upon “liberated” Poland.

EVIL BETRAYAL: THE “AUGUST SETBACK” DID NOT KEEP THE RED ARMY FROM ASSISTING THE WARSAW INSURGENTS

On August 1, 1944, the Red Army was approaching the eastern outskirts of Warsaw, prompting the Poles to launch the Uprising. But then a German counterattack (which I call the “August Setback”) drove the Soviet forces back. Glantz has examined the Soviet archives, and concludes that the “August setback” at most delayed the Red Army taking Warsaw by one month (September 1944), and certainly not five and a half months (January 1945).

Glantz elaborates:

“Political considerations and motivations aside, an objective appraisal of combat along the Warsaw axis indicates, prior to early September, German resistance was sufficient to halt any Soviet assistance to the Poles in Warsaw, even were it intended. Thereafter, in early September a major reorientation of military efforts from the Magnuszew region in the south or, more realistically, from the Western Bug and Narew River axis in the north would have been required for Rokossovsky to muster sufficient forces to force the Vistula River and break into the city of Warsaw. And once penetrated, Warsaw would have been a costly city to clear of Germans and clearly an unsuitable location from which to launch a subsequent offensive.” (pp. 422-423).

The bottom line is clear: Excuses aside, the Red Army was militarily capable of taking Warsaw during the Warsaw Uprising–if not in August 1944, then certainly in September 1944! Case closed. The Russian “allies” are guilty as charged: Theirs was an evil betrayal of the Warsaw Uprising.

EXCUSES….EXCUSES…

The exculpations for Soviet inaction, repeated by Glantz, come thick and fast. Let us examine them. His notion that “Warsaw would be have been a costly city to clear of Germans” is nonsense. Whoever said that German forces would remain in Warsaw once the Red Army was about to surround the city? And, in any case, the Red Army never before had any problem capturing cities whenever it was capable of doing so–with or without the threat of getting bogged down in urban combat.

The “unsuitable location” argument is equally bogus. The Red Army freely captured cities regardless of their suitability or otherwise for launching subsequent offensives.

The “major reorientation of military efforts” that was putatively required is no more convincing. Military commanders are known to be flexible in their strategies in the face of changing battlefield realities. For example, the advancing Anglo-American forces did not have Paris as their immediate objective. But once the Parisians rose up, the Anglo-American forces promptly redirected their forces to liberate Paris.

The “river bridgehead priority” argument, repeated by Glantz, is dubious at best. Long ago, Commander Bor Komorowski pointed out that the Red Army experienced no difficulty in crossing the Dnieper River, even though it was three times wider than the Vistula:

https://www.jewsandpolesdatabase.org/2019/11/04/jew-killing-wwii-by-poles-bogus-order-bor-komorowski/

EVIL BETRAYAL: NEGLECTED CONSIDERATIONS

David Glantz fails to mention that German General von Vormann, who was in charge of blocking any Soviet military advance in the Warsaw area, had fully expected the Red Army to move on Warsaw during the Warsaw Uprising. Hw should be one who knows what he is talking about! See:

https://www.jewsandpolesdatabase.org/2020/11/21/the-soviet-betrayed-warsaw-uprising-german-general-vormann-expected-a-red-army-move-on-warsaw-in-august-1944-sawicki/

Author Glantz also fails to mention the fact that the Russians could have assisted the Warsaw Uprising without any troop movements at all. As pointed out by historian Leszek Zebrowski, the Soviets could have reduced the Varsovians’ defenselessness against German bombing and strafing, and artillery fire. They could have done so by using their own artillery, and by providing air cover. See:

https://www.jewsandpolesdatabase.org/2019/11/04/warsaw-uprising-1944-propaganda-countered-zebrowski/

EVIL BETRAYAL: ADMITTING THE OBVIOUS: THE RUSSIANS BETRAYED THE WARSAW UPRISING

Glantz finally stops beating around the bush with his well-meaning detailed analysis of German and Soviet troop movements, and finally tells the unvarnished truth. He concludes, “Regardless of the Red Army’s military rationale for its failure to capture Warsaw in August and September 1944, it was undoubtedly true, for political reasons, Stalin was in no hurry to aid Bor-Komorowski’s insurgent forces. Since the Polish insurgents in Warsaw owed their allegiance to the British- and American-backed exile government in London, it was politically convenient for Stalin to have the Poles and Germans kill each other off. The limited joint Soviet-Polish efforts to reach Warsaw on 10 September and once again on 16-17 September simply encouraged the Polish insurgents to fight on. Until mid-September Stalin also refused permission to the U.S. Army Air Force to employ Soviet airfields in their planned efforts to parachute supplies to the insurgents. By the time the first such missions were flown, the area of Warsaw remaining in Polish hands was too small for parachute drops. After two months of heroic resistance, the Poles capitulated on 2 October.” (p. 430).

THE RUSSIAN BETRAYAL IN ALL ITS PERFIDIOUS FULLNESS

I conclude by quoting from RAF Air Marshall Slessor. See:

https://www.jewsandpolesdatabase.org/2019/11/04/warsaw-uprising-1944-soviet-betrayal-condemned-by-raf-marshal-slessor/

Slessor does not mince words about the evil betrayal as he writes, “…of deathless heroism on the part of the Polish Underground Army fighting against desperate and increasingly hopeless odds in the tortured city of Warsaw; and of the BLACKEST-HEARTED, COLDEST-BLOODED TREACHERY ON THE PART OF THE RUSSIANS. I am not a naturally vindictive man, but I hope that there may be some very special hell reserved for the brutes in the Kremlin who betrayed Bor’s army…” (emphasis added).

Amen!

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